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DOCUMENT NO. 20  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. A  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE 8 JUN 1980 REVIEWER:

24 November 1959

Copy No. C 65

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



State Department review completed

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 November 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### II. ASIA-AFRICA

*No* Hammar-skjold-Laos: UN Secretary General Hammar-skjold's recent talks with Laotian officials suggest that he still favors some type of negotiated settlement or at least some gesture by Vientiane toward the Communist bloc which would emphasize Laotian neutrality. According to Laotian Prime Minister Phoui, Hammar-skjold specifically mentioned Laotian acceptance of mediation by India, indefinite postponement of the impending trials of pro-Communist leaders, and willingness to accept economic assistance from all UN members.

British policy makers also continue to believe that negotiations between the Communist bloc and Laos could lead toward a settlement of the dissident problem in Laos.)

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*Nº*  
Indonesia - Communist China: President Sukarno told the Chinese Communist ambassador on 20 November that Indonesia will implement the ban on alien retailers in rural areas whether the Chinese like it or not, according to Foreign Minister Subandrio. Sukarno stated he would listen to no further objections at this time on this subject. Referring to the Chinese Embassy official who has been particularly active in trying to obstruct the Indonesian decree, Subandrio told the American ambassador that Indonesia planned to find a way to get rid of him without declaring him persona non grata.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Hammarskjold's Plans for Laos

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold's recent talks with Laotian officials suggest that he still favors some type of negotiated settlement or at least some gesture by Vientiane toward the Communist bloc which would emphasize Laotian neutrality. According to Laotian Prime Minister Phoui, Hammarskjold would devise an over-all economic development plan to be financed by contributions from "any or all UN members." Phoui fears that this would involve Laotian acceptance of economic assistance from the Soviet bloc and open the country to Communist agents.

Hammarskjold also brought up the question of reactivating the International Control Commission but, in the face of continued opposition from Phoui, asked why Laos could not at least accept mediation by India. The secretary general dwelt constantly on the impending trials of pro-Communist leaders and urged the Laotian Government to postpone the trials indefinitely in order to maintain maximum sympathy of friendly nations.

British policy makers also continue to incline toward negotiations between the Communist bloc and Laos as a means to settlement, despite their desire for Western unity and their recent rejection of the Soviet proposal for an international conference. Foreign Secretary Lloyd has reiterated in Parliament his government's desire for a neutral Laos. The government's rejection of an international conference may be subjected to a more searching Labor attack in Parliament.

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Indonesian President Rejects Further Chinese  
Communist Protests

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[ ] President Sukarno underscored Indonesia's firmness in its recent relations with Peiping when he told the Chinese Communist ambassador on 20 November that, despite Peiping's objections, Djakarta will implement its decree banning alien retailers in rural areas. Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, who described the interview to the American ambassador, said Sukarno had not given an inch and had been even tougher than he, Subandrio, had been.

Sukarno told the Chinese ambassador he would listen to no further objections to the Indonesian ban at this time but would consider complaints after a lapse of four months. When the ambassador accused Sukarno of playing into the hands of Western imperialists, the President told him he needed no advice on this subject. He said that Indonesians, when accused by foreigners of making mistakes, were likely to re-examine their actions but were capable of "coming back hard" if no fault were found and the critic persisted.

Sukarno refused to lift restrictions on the movements of Chinese Embassy personnel but agreed to release a Chinese consul general placed under house arrest by the Indonesian Army for obstructing the decree in West Java. Subandrio said the government would find a way to ease him out of the country without declaring him persona non grata.

The Indonesian Communist party, which has been placed in an embarrassing position by Peiping's pressure on the Indonesian Government for repeal of the decree, has charged that the Indonesian Army is responsible for the Sino-Indonesian tension. A party statement of 21 November accused the West Java army command of implementing the decree in a manner which opposed the spirit of the Sino-Indonesian joint communiqué of early October, issued when Subandrio visited Peiping. This criticism of the army may provoke further army measures to limit Communist party activity.

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